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Abstract
The unexpected discoveries at the beginning of the century, partic-
ularly thanks to Heisenberg, Bohr, and Go¨del, has driven the science
to drastic changes, opening new, extraordinary, and infinite research
fields. After this, many scientists saw, and still today see, a crisis, with
dreadful meaning, in the science. However, this crisis is only present
in that type of science, driven by determinism, which is strictly linked
to the common sense.
Originally published in italian:
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The first half of this century has been one of the most intense period in
human history: tragic episodes - the two world wars - were interwoven with
moments of great cultural activity. At the end of the XIX century, the world
was still permeated with an extremely determinist spirit, which was the re-
sult of the philosophical ideas of the previous centuries: Enlightment first
and Positivism later on. The former - which historically coincides with the
XVIII century - tried to “enlighten” the mind of man, seized by ignorance
and superstition, through science and knowledge. The latter - borne on the
wave of the great scientific discoveries of the time - may well be seen as an
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evolution of Enlightment. The word ‘positivism’ has been introduced by Au-
guste Comte to make a distinction among the scientific stage of knowledge
man had reached and the metaphysical and the theological ones. Positivism
recognizes in science the only and real knowledge and takes it as a model
for every other part of knowledege. Its scientific rationality and experimen-
tal methodology became universal, stonewalling any other kind of reason.
This kind of rationality was based upon the convinction that only facts have
value, along with their prevision and understading: this was the only way to
reach a positive control of phenomena, according to the needs of mankind.
Materialism and Scientism came later on and brought to their extremes the
positivistic ideas on the superiority of science, of evolutionism and denied
the existance of any kind of metaphysics.
However, towards the end of the XIX century, the impossibility in ob-
taining a satisfactory explanation of some phenomena showed the deep de-
ficiencies of Positivists’ deterministic materialism1. These problems were
overcome thanks to the introduction of a mathematical formalism, the first
step towards quantum mechanics. In 1925, the German Werner Heisenberg,
Max Born and Pascual Jordan provided a first formulation based on the ma-
trix calculus. One year later, Erwin Schro¨dinger proposed an alternative way,
using waves. Therefore, in 1926, two formalisms were availaible, the wave
mechanics and the matrix, capable of investigating on atomic phenomena.
The symbolic formulation by Paul A. M. Dirac, an English physicist was then
added to these.
The three theories proved to be equivalent; perhaps the most important
consequence was to discover that both light and matter have particle–like and
wave–like properties. The old debate on the nature of light, dating back to
Newton and Huygens, seemed therefore solved, though a new problem arose:
that of how could light be both a particle and a wave. Werner Heisenberg and
Niels Bohr showed that this inconsistency was only apparent: in 1927, the
former published a legendary article, where he enounced the famous principle
of indeterminacy [8]. This principle can be summarized with this definition:
it is not possible to know simultaneously and with precision the position and
the moment of a particle.
On 16th September of the same year, during an intenational congress
at Como, held for the centenary of Alessandro Volta’s death, Niels Bohr
1For a throughout tractation of the history of physics of this period see [14], [1], [5],
[12].
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introduced the principle of complementarity [2] of which there is no precise
enunciation. Bohr spoke about it in this way:
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to re-
gard the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the
union of which characterizes the classical theories, as comple-
mentary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing
the idealization of observation and definition respectively [2].
Along with this Bohr brought some examples, such as the debate on the
nature of light and of the ultimate parts of matter; after all, what this princi-
ple enounces is that matter has a dual behaviour, wave–like and particle–like.
One of the main consequences of these principles regards the concept
of reality. On this subject Bohr writes [2] that each observation of atomic
phenomena involves a considerable interaction with the measure instrument:
therefore neither the phenomenon, nor the instrument can be assigned an
indipendent and objective reality, in the ordinary sense of physics. On the
other hand, the great Danish physicist adds that an element of arbitrariness
is already implicit in the concept of observation, for it depends on who is
considered to be the observator and who is the observed.
The fact that classical physics could develop, and the reason why it is
not necessary to throw it away today, is due to the extremely small value of
the action quantum (we remind that h = 6.62618 ·10−34 Js) as to the actions
playing in the common sensorial perception. However, these principles should
always be borne in mind when speaking about any sector of physics, and even
of science, to remember that what one is speaking about is not nature and
not even its image.
It is Niels Bohr again who provides us with the correct definition: physics
regards what we can say about nature, it is the writing of evidences around
a praxis (see [11]). Bohr gave this definition of the experiment [3]:
. . . with the word “experiment” we can only mean a procedure
regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we
have done and what we have learnt.
We have to remember that every time one formulates a theory, one sets
hypotheses of effectiveness which generally consist in excluding one factor or
another. How many times one has supposed that a phenomenon was linear?
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How many times one has supposed it ideal (rigid bodies, geometrical bodies,
material points). How many times one supposes that the resistance of an
electric device is negligible? How many times is friction considered negligi-
ble? And taking into consideration the two-bodies problem, one forgets the
interactions among the bodies of the universe, isn’t it? Physics and engi-
neering are permeated with hypothesis of this kind, without which we could
not adventure in building models or formulating theories. The more or less
indirect consequences for engineering are constituted by the introduction of
the safety factor, by the concept of reliability of devices; in physics we speak
about the experimental errors, the domain of validity of a theory and so on.
With all these hypotheses, how could one say what is the nature? This is not
a mere philosophical speculation, a sophism, a formal problem.
Words have a fundamental importance in all human activities. In 1623,
Galileo Galilei wrote in his book Il Saggiatore that nature was like a book
written in a mathematical language [6]. Quantum physics shows that math-
ematics is not the language of nature, but an invented language created by
man through which it is possible to say something about nature. It is a
refinement (or an impoverishment?) of language eligible to represent those
relations for which the commmon word would result imprecise or far too com-
plex. The importance of mathematics as a language for physics has come up
with the advent of quantum physics indeed. As a matter of facts, contempo-
rary physics can be briefly divided in two parts: one based on the analysis of
the phenomena for which we have direct experience, of the everyday world
and that express itself with the common language. The other is consituted
by those phenomena which regard the extremely small (quantum physics)
and the speeds near to that of light (relativistic physics), of which we have
neither direct experience nor an adequate language to describe them, ex-
cept that of mathematics. When speaking about quantum and relativistic
physics an uncorrect use of words could lead to misunderstandings creating
inappropriate images. Heisenberg’s comment is that we have then to resign
to the fact that the experimental observations in the extremely small and in
the extremely wide cannot give more than an intuitive image; whithin these
fields we have to learn to do without intuition [9].
However, one is not allowed to think that mathematics is the last hope
for Determinism. As a matter of fact the analogous of the principles of inde-
terminacy for mathematics was expressed by Kurt Go¨del in 1931 [7]. In his
article, he stated the impossibility to realize the hilbertian program: in 1900,
during the Second International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris, David
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Hilbert introduced a list of 23 problems which covered the most different
fields of mathematics [10]. Among these, point 2, relative to the demon-
stration of non-contradiction of arithmetics, deserves a particular attention.
From Hilbert’s viewpoint all mathematical theories should have been reduced
to formal systems: then this would have been enough to demonstrate the
non-contradiction. In 1930, Go¨del wrote an article, which was published one
year later where he demonstrated that this was not possible. As a matter of
facts, within a sytem like that expressed by Bertrand Russell and Alfred N.
Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica it is possible to express proposi-
tions which are not decidable within the system’s axioms. One can view this
as the impossibility of defining each concept through a unique and defined
linguistic universe.
The expression of these formulations made many scientists feel dejected,
they cried science had reached its end. Many of them did not want to leave
the anchor of an objective reality, existing independently from everything
else: Einstein, Planck, Schro¨dinger so to cite some of them. Einstein’s posi-
tions has nearly become legendary: during the Solvay congress, held in 1927
in Bruxelles, he expressed many ideal experiments which should have inval-
idated the principles of quantum mechanics, though they were punctually
disproved by Bohr and Heisenberg. Einstein recognized the validity of quan-
tum mechanics though he refused to accept it, summarizing this aprioristic
refusal with the famous sentence “God does not play dice” to which Bohr
replied that “Our problem does not not consist in telling God how he has to
govern the world” (see [9], Chapter 7).
Nowadays, many physicists still refuse quantum physics for they consider
it irrational or mystical. Even today they are calling it crisis: Marcello Cini
speaks about a “paradise lost” [4] and not long ago Eugenio Sarti wrote an
article for this Review [13].
Using the term ‘crisis’ they suggest something dreadful, that will lead
to the very end of science. Some scientists think that this crisis is already
operating and it is the result of the principles up to now discussed, others
think it will come along with the Great Unified Theory. Nevertheless, the
word ‘crisis’ shows no dreadful meanings: it derives from the Greek κρισις,
which in turn is linked to κρινω, which means ‘to divide’ and metaphorically
‘to decide’ 2. It were the Greeks the first to introduce the process of analysis
2It is interesting to see that the word ‘science’ as well comes from the sanscrit root skad-
, skid-, which means ‘to cut’, ‘to mince’; knowledge should then result from the separation
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as a division of a thesis in propositions, leading more easily to truth. If,
within a theory, we separate or, better, underline, some essential laws we
could then consider them as principles for a new theory. Analysis is essential
to science because, as Paolo Zellini writes [15], this divide et impera preserves
the thesis from the risk of a total rejection deriving from an excess of rigidity
or from an unconscious desire for barreness; it diverts the attention on the
central parts of the demonstration, revealing those hidden hypotesis faked by
counterexamples. Counterexamples do not actually fake the thesis as a whole,
rather some of its implicit assumptions, not always recognized when trying to
demonstrate it. A scientific theory thrives until these implicit assumptions,
eligible to be faked by counterexamples, exist. The surprising thing is that,
as Imre Lakatos writes (see [15]), these concepts grow by themselves and
generate a maze of problems.
The word, let it be mathematical or from the common language, cannot
be managed: all those huge programs that claim to ground some discipline,
that believe to find the ultimate formula, the pill, the magic potion which
gives knowldge, well all these programs cannot but result in some grounds
crisis: as Lakatos wrote (see [15]), both certainty and banality are infantile
illnesses of knowledge.
However, this ground crisis should not degeneratre in a skeptical cynism
or in mysticism. The principles up to now discussed suggest the solution
for they do not imply the end of science, not at all. That is the good of it,
because thanks to these principles an unknown, endless universe is opened
wide to us, waiting to be analyzed.
The infinite that we still consider with mistrust, in ancient Greece was
απǫιρoν, ‘without limits’, ‘unlimited’. Aristotle (see [16]) wrote that infinite
is not that out of which there is nothing, though that out of which there is
always something. The unlimited cannot therefore be regaded as a complete
whole: what is completed has an end and the end is a limiting element,
while απǫιρoν shows for its very meaning the absence of any limits (see
[16]). Tannery (see [16]) suggested to derive Anassimander’s απǫιρoν from
πǫιρα meaning ‘knowledge’, instead of deriving it from πǫρας, ‘limit’: in this
way the unlimited became the unknowable (see [16]).
Anyway, the importance on the infinite is in its becoming. As Aristotle
wrote in his Physics, if the limit is what make each object exist, giving it
a form, the infinite is its opposite principle that prevents each object to be
of notions.
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fixed in its limits, within its boundaries. Anassimander thought that the
απǫιρoν was the very principle of becoming.
When somebody will find the ultimate formula, then the end of math-
ematics and physics will come. Bohr’s, Go¨del’s and Heisenberg’s essays do
not state the limits of science, on the contrary they show the non-existance
of these boundaries.
These are no comfortable ways, as some of the stronger supporter of
Determinism thought, rather these are big steps forward made by science. It
is not by chance that this revolution has taken place in mathematics, a highly
sophisticated language, and in physics, that uses this language intensively.
If we really look for a crisis in science we will see that there is one in
mathematics and in physics for these sciences look for completeness, for the
seek their beginning to determine their end though this was already clear
in 1927 for physics and in 1931 for mathematics. Nevertheless there is who
prefers to ignore these questions and go on trying to build a deterministic
world, complete, limited, foreseable. We are not stating that this is wrong
or that this should not be done, for when one researches it is not possible to
say what is to be done or not. The important is to do and then who knows
if from these researches some interesting hint may come.
However, it is essential for research to investigate the infinite.
References
[1] Bellone E., Caos e armonia - Storia della fisica moderna e contempo-
ranea (UTET, Torino, 1990).
[2] Bohr N., The quantum postulate and the recent development of atomic
theory, Nature 121, (1928), 580-590.
[3] Bohr N., Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge
(Wiley, New York, 1963), p. 3.
[4] Cini M., Un paradiso perduto (Feltrinelli, Milano, 1994).
[5] Daumas M., Histoire de la Science (Gallimard, Paris, 1957); italian
translation Storia della Scienza - vol. 3: Le scienze del mondo fisico
(Laterza, Bari, 1976).
7
[6] Galilei G., Il Saggiatore, edited by L. Sosio (Feltrinelli, Milano, 1979),
p. 38.
[7] Go¨del K., U¨ber formal unentscheidbare Sa¨tze der Principia Mathematica
und verwandter Systeme I, Monatshefte fu¨r Mathematik und Physik 38,
(1931), 172-198; english translation in Collected Works - Vol. 1, edited
by S. Feferman, J. Dawson, S.C. Kleene, G.H. Moore, R.M. Solovay and
J. van Heijenoort (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986), p. 144-195.
[8] Heisenberg W., U¨ber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen
Kinematik und Mechanik, Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 43, (1927), 172-198.
English translation in J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek, Quantum theory
and measurement (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983), pp.
62-84.
[9] Heisenberg W., Tradition in der Wissenschaft. Reden und Aufsa¨tze.;
italian translation La tradizione nella scienza (Garzanti, Milano, 1982).
[10] Hilbert D., Mathematical problems, Lecture delivered before the Inter-
national Congress of Mathematicians at Paris in 1900; english transla-
tion by M. Winston Newson, with author’s permission, in Bulletin of
the American Mathematical Society 8, (1902), 437-479.
[11] Petersen A., The philosophy of Niels Bohr, The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, September 1963, 8-14.
[12] Rhodes R., The making of the Atomic bomb, 1986; italian translation
L’invenzione della bomba atomica (Rizzoli, Milano, 1990).
[13] Sarti E., Go¨del, Shannon, e la crisi della scienza, AEI 82, (1995), 163-
167.
[14] Segre` E., From X-Rays to Quarks (W.H. Freeman, New York, 1980).
[15] Zellini P., La ribellione del numero (Adelphi, Milano, 1985).
[16] Zellini P., Breve storia dell’infinito (Adelphi, Milano, 1993).
8
